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In The Netherlands, as in many countries, unemployment rates of lower
educated workers are higher and more cyclical than unemployment rates
of higher educated workers. In this paper we test whether this is caused
by the fact that more highly educated individuals occupy simple jobs in
cyclical downturns. We use a unique firm-worker dataset to investigate
this hypothesis. In addition, we examine to what extent workers with more
years of schooling earn higher wages than their less educated colleagues at
the same job level in the same firm. We find that at one of the lower job
complexity levels, the difference between schooling of the inflow and the
outflow increases in cyclical downtums. At the same time, workers with
surplus schooling earn somewhat lower wages at this job level. For the
other job complexity levels we find no evidence for crowding out.
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11 Introduction
Most Eiuopean labor markets are characterized by both relatively high and rel-
atively cyclical imemployment rates for lower educated workera. In recent lit-
erature, most attention has gone out to explain the relatively high stock of low
skilled unemployment, see e.g. Layard et al. (1991), OECD (1996), Nickell and
Bell (1996). There arefour main explanations for this fact. First, skill biased tech-
nological change in an imperfect labor market can lead to a fall in the demand for
lower educated workers. Second, increased competition and international trade
leads to a change in the industrial structure. Third, wage floors like for example
the minimum wage reduce labor demand for unskilled workera. Besides those
three explanations which focus on the demand side, there is a fourth explanation
which focuses on the supply side of the labor market. According to this explana-
tion, unskilled workers have higher replacement rates when unemployed and thus
they have less incentives to work.
The fact that the unemployment rate of lower educated workers increases
relatively strongly in cyclical downturna (for evidence see e.g. Van Ours and
Ridder, 1995) is generally explained by the fact that firms typically invest more
in job specific capital for highly educated workers. The highly educated workers
will therefore be hoarded during recessions and the lower educated workers will
be laid off. See e.g. Oi (1968) and Hamermesh (1993).1
In addition to the explanations just mentioned there is the less familiar ex-
planation of "crowding out"of lower educated workers by workera with a higher
education. This explanation has been rather popular in the Netherlands (see e.g.
Asselberghs et al. (1997) and Teulings and Koopmanschap (1989) and has been
iised to explain both the high unemployment rates for lower educated workers
(dociunented in Table 1) and the fact that low skilled unemployment is more
cyclical.
One of the first models of job competition and crowding out was developed
by Thurow (1975). In this model, the labor market is not a market of matching
demand and supply for various job akills but one of matching trainable individ-
uals with training ladders. Moreover, the marginal product is associated with
jobs rather than with workers. In this view, the labor market is a closed system.
When there is a fixed amount ofjobs with fixed characteristics (including wages)
and an exceas supply of labor, it is likely that higher educated (and cheaper
trainable) workers who cannot find a job will accept jobs below their level at
the crost of workers with intermediate skills, who will in tiun accept simple jobs.
Finally, at the end of the line there are the lowest educated workera who become
iinemployed. The problem with thia explanation is that the composition of var
1Pfann and Palm (1990) give evidence that adjustment casts are much higher for white
collar workera. Also note that when workera who become unemployed looae akilla, thete will be
persistence in the level of low akilled unemployment and the diatinction between cycfical and
structural unemployment vaniahea.
2cancies does not adjnst at all to the composition of the labor market. Moreover,
both employers and workers who are employed below their job level can improve
their position by forming better matches and it is therefore hard to believe that
crowding out is a long lasting structural phenomenon. If one looks at cross coim-
try comparisons, the evidence also strongly suggests that coimtries with a highly
edttcated labor force have relatively more complex jobs than cotmtries with a
relatively lower ediicated labor force. Similazly, we see that over a longer time
span, both the fraction of simple jobs and the fraction of workers with a lower
education has fallen. This suggests that in the long rtm, the composition of jobs
and workers move in the same direction. There is also a 5mdamental measiue-
ment problem associated with structiual crowding out since we never observe
worker skills and job reqturements exactly. It is therefore virtually impossible to
correctly label someone to be overqualified for a partictilar job. One basically has
to make the extreme asstunption that the econometrician observes more than the
individual firm and worker who have decided to form a matc.h. Moreover, the
job reqtrirement is often not fiilly determined before the formation of a match.
Hence, we camiot conchtde from the simple fact that some workers with a higher
education occupy simple jobs that crowding out takes place. It is therefore likely
that crowding out, if ptesent, is a cyclical phenomenon.2
An early model that allows for cyclical crowding out is the one by Okun (1981)
who has sitggested that in bad times it is costly to adjt~st wages and that firms will
therefore increase their hiring standards instead. A different reason for cyclical
crowding out is given by st.andard job seazch theory. When it takes time for
workers and vacancies to find each other, a possible strategy for higher educated
workers is to temporary accept. a simple job and to continue searching for a more
c,omplex job which pays a higher wage. There are however also reasons to believe
that cyclical crowding out is an unlikely outcome. McCormick (1990) shows for
example that skilled workers may be rehictant to accept unskilled jobs even on a
temporary basis becai~se of fear of stigmatization. Therefore, tmemployed higher
educated workers tend to invest in job search, rather than take an interim position
at an unskilled job.
The empirical evidence on the existence of cyclical crowding out is mixed.
The general approach that has been followed is to relate a measure of labor mar-
ket tension to the education-job level distribution. Teulings and Koopmanschap
(1989) iise regional differences in tmemployment rates as a meastue for labor
market tension. They fotmd that the relative change in the employment share
of workers with a lower editcation at occupations for which, in general, only a
lower education is required is lower in regions with high tmemployment, and they
therefore conclitde that there is crowding out. A problem with this approach is
2Hecker (1992) has atgued that from 1970 onwards, an increasing number of U5 college
students were employed at "high school jobs". This paper got a lot ofattention in the popular
press. Tyler et al. (1995) showed however that during the 80's, the fraction of young college
graduates at "high school jobs" declined and that their real earnings increased.
3that the analysis foctuses on occupations rather than job levels.. It can therefore
not be niled oiit that the results aze driven by differences in adji~stment costs
between workers with different. education levels at the same occiipations. More-
over, workers can move freely between regions. Van Ours and Ridder (1995) iise
V~U ratios of different labor market segments to test for cyclical crowding oiit. A
necessary condition for crowding out in their model is that an tinemployed worker
is better of seazching at lower level jobs. The approach of Van Oius and Ridder
fociises at the supply side of the labor market. The idea is that crowding out
takes place when the ratio of unemployed job seekers to vacancies in a partictilaz
segment exceeds the ratio of imemployed job seekers to vacancies in the lower
neighboring segment. Only then, it becomes optimal to supply labor below one's
level. Except for workers with an academic degree they find no evidence that the
V~U ratio's are higher at lower labor market segments and they conclude that
the disproportionately high unemployment rates for lower educated workers mi~st
be due to the higher firing rate that this group faces.
Van Oius and Ridder find that supply orientated cyclical crowding out is
lazgely irrelevant. We focus on demand orientated (cyclical) crowding oiit. Oiu
data allow us to directly test at the firm level whether the quality of the workforce
increases during periods of high unemployment. The data we i~se aze unique in the
sense that they contain information on both worker, job and firm chazacteristics.
Other advantages of our data are that they are based on administrative records,
that the key variables for crowding out (education and job complexity level) are
measured independently and that we observe both new and separating workers.
If cyclical crowding out is important, firms reqiure more schooling at given job
complexity levels during bad times. We will therefore test whether the difference
in years of schooling between the inflow and outflow of workers for a given job
level in a pazticiilar firm, is lazger during low employment yeazs. Unlike some of
the previot~s studies, which restricted crowding out to be an inflow phenomenon
only, we will allow crowding oiit to be the result of a combination of inflow and
oiitflow policies at the firm level. Moreover, we can directly observe whether
upgrading is the result of the oiitflow of workers with a relatively lower education
or whether it is cai~sed by the inflow of workers with a relatively higher education,
at given job levels.
An additional advantage of oiu data is that we have information on gross
hourly wage data to distinguish between substitution and piue crowding out
and that we can test whether the rettuns to schooling are still positive when we
condition on job complexity levels. Our findings suggest that the wage differential
between new workers who have followed relatively many years of schooling and
their direct colleagties (in the same firm at the same job level) is almost zero.
The discussion on crowding out has aLso entered the policy arena. F4om a wel-
fare point of view, crowding oiit can never be a first best sohition since potential
productivity is not used. It is therefore often argued that policy makers should
stimulate job creation at the top segment of the labor mazket when crowding out
4exists (see e.g. Asselberghs et al. (1998)). This is sometimes called a"choking
chimney" policy. If on the other hand, the high and cyclical tmemployment rates
for workers with a lower education are catused by any of the explanations men-
tioned at the beginning of this paper, policy makers cottld better directly focus
at the bottom segment of the labor mazket. Another conventional wisdom is that
when there is crowding out, there is no need for extra education of low skilled
workers since those workers wotild occttpy simple jobs anyway.3 This view is also
typically based on a static and mechanical view of the labor market. If crowding
out is for example the result of seazch frictions, better schooling will lead to the
opening of more complex job vacancies and will lower overall unemployment.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the data we use
for testing the empirical relevance of crowding otit and present some descriptive
statistics. In section 3 we test to what extent employers exploit recessions to
improve the average skill level of their work force at given job complexity levels.
Finally in section 4, we investigate whether workers with relatively many years
of education at a given job level earn higher wages than their direct colleagues
at the same job level in the same firm.
2 Data and descriptive statistics
2.1 Data
For this paper we have tt.sed the AVO data set of the Depaztment of Social Affairs
and Employment which covers the period 1992-96. The data were originally
collected to obtain information on the development of wage income for different
categories of workers and are based on administrative records of firms by means
of a stratified two step sampling procedure. In the first step a sample of firms is
drawn from the Department's own firm register (which is roughly similar to the
firm register of Statistics Netherlands).4 In the second step a sample of workers
is drawn within each of these firms.
At the first stage, a sample offirms was selected tising a stratified (by indttstry
and firm size) design. The number of strata changed between surveys. In 1993,
the sample that. we use consists of 1682 firms which were drawn from 80 strata,
in 1994, the sample consists of 1563 firms from 280 strata, in 1995, the sample
3The following remarks from the popular press re8ect this popular view. Robert Samuelson
wrote in a Newsweek column of August 1992: "...~Iff more people had gone to college in the
1980's they would have competed mostly for lower-wage joós that usually don't require a degree".
In the same year, SylviaNasar wrote an article with the suggestive title "More College graduates
taking low-wage jobs" in the New York Times.
4Firms from the service sector and other semi-public sectors were included in all samples.
Since the 1993 sample contained no information on public sector workers, we excluded this
sector from the other samples as well.
5contains 1375 firms from 312 strata, and in 1996 there are 1548 firms from 328
strata. Particularly firms with less than 10 employees are under-represented.
At the second stage, a sample of workers was drawn from the firms which
were selected in the first step. This was done as follows. ~om small firms
(c20 employees) the entire work force was sampled whereas for larger firms, the
fraction of workers who were sampled decreases with firm size. Then, in October
of year t, an aselect sample of workers from the wage administration of each
firm was drawn and in addition information was obtained on the total outflow
of workers within each fu.m. From the workers sampled at October of year t
additional information on hours worked and wage earnings was obtained from
the wage administration of October ( t- 1). Moreover, to obtain information
on sepazating workers, a ntunber of workers (consistent with the total outflow
rate of the firm) who were present in October of year t- 1 and who were not
present at October of year t were drawn in addition. After this aselect sample of
workers was drawn, it was checked whether minimally 10 workers had a collective
wage agreement and 10 workers had no collective wage agreement and whether
there were minimally 8 stayers, 8 new workers and 8 sepazating workers in the
sample. If this was not the case, the worker sample was extended to obtain those
minimiun levels, except of course for those firms which employed, for example,
less than 10 workers with a collective wage agreement or which hired less than
8 new workers. On average, more than 75010 of the workers were present at both
sample moments. When workers were only present at October t-1 and not at
October t(outflow), information was obtained on the new labor market state of
the worker.s
Thus, the sampling probability for an individual worker depends on the prob-
ability that the firm is sampled and the probability that the worker is sampled
within the firm, which in turn depends on the size of the firm. It depends indi-
rectly (when less than a mirumum level of a certain worker type was sampled) on
the type of wage contract, whether the worker is a new entrant, a stayer or has
left in the previoi~s period. For each observation a weight (eqiia] to the inverse
of the sampling probability) was constructed. In addition, separate firm weights
were constructed which are eqital to the inverse of the sampling probability of the
fum. When the tmit of observation in our analysis is the firm, we use firm level
weights while when the unit of observation is the individual, we use firm~worker
weights to obtain popiilation quantities. As mentioned before, only for some vari-
ables (wages, hotus worked), information is available for both year t and t- 1
but for the variable which measures the job complexity level this information is
not available. Thi~s we have for example no information on promotions within
firms between year t and t- 1. In addition, we miss the workers who were hired
after October t- 1 and who left before October t- 1. We have information
SThe in- and outflow rates appear to be consistent with figures from other data sources (the
Dutch Social Security Council), see Gautier (1997).
6on gross wages (also on over time payments and profit shares), hotus worked,
days worked, echication, job comple}city level, occupation, age, temue, gender,
and type of wage contract. For a detailed description of the job complexity and
edncation levels we refer to the appendix and to Venema (1996), Wiggers (1998),
and Gautier (1998) in which the AVO data aze compared with other sotuces.
Tlte advantages of the AVO data aze that we observe both worker and firm
characteristics, and that it is based on administrative records so that we have
very few cnissing observations. Moreover, the data contain detailed information
on the in- and outflow of workers. Finally, education and job complexity, the key
variables for crowding out aze meastued independently.
There is also a mmzber of limitations. Due to the complex sample design
and the many strata, some (firm) weights become extremely lazge. It turns
out that this serioi~sly infíuences certain key variables and leads to differences
of the variables in our sample and the Dtttch labor force stuvey (EBB), col-
lected by statistics Netherlands. We therefore chose to remove the records with
(worker~firm) weights lazger than 500 from the sample (about 5o1o for each year).
Those were mainly workers employed at small firms in small sectors. We have
checked whether the new sample is more representative for the entire working
popiilation by comparing the distribittions of a munber of key vatiables over time
and with the Labor Force Siuvey of the Central Biueau of Statistics and this
seemed to be the case (although the weighted fraction of small firms in otu sam-
ple is still larger in 1993 than in the other yeazs.s Another disadvantage of this
data set is that. it does not contain any information on value added, output,
profits, capital and investment.The main reason for this is that the data were
designed to stttdy wage growth and therefore only information from the wage
aclministration of firms was obtained. Table 2 shows some chazacteristics of the
AVO data. We see that most of the means of variables like age, gender and
education, are quite stable over time. Also note that relatively more small firms
and more workers with a(semi) collective wage agreement were present in the
1993 sample. In otu formal tests of section 4 we will therefore have to control for
those vaziables. The behavior of the education and job complexity distributions
will be disctussed at more length in the next section.
2.2 Descriptive statistics
First, we will show that 1993 and to a lesser extent 1994 can be considered
to be bad years in terms of employment opporttmities. The strong recovery
of employment in the Netherlands started in 1995 and continued in the years
thereafter. Table 5 shows that in 1993 tmemployment increased strongly while
few vacancies were created. In 1995 and 1996 unemployment fell and many
vacancies were created. Moreover, the v~u ratios for almost all education groups,
6In our analysis in the next section we will however controlfor fam size
7and in particular for those with only elementary school were lower in 1993 than
in 1995 and 1996. This cyclical pattern is also present in the AVO data. Ffom
table 2, we see that the difference between the inflow and the otttflow rates was
sttbstantially higher in 1995 and 1996 than in 1993 and 1994. In addition, the
fraction of workers employed at shrinking firms was higher while the fraction of
workers employed at growing firms was lower in 1993 and 1994 than in 1995 and
1996.
In Tables 3 and 4, we give information on the skill and education structure
of jobs and workers based on four AVO stuveys (92-93, 93-94, 94-95 and 95-
96). The samples of period t contain information on employment in period t and
t- 1. Since job complexity is only meastued once, the differences in fractions of
workers employed at a pazticttlaz job complexity level between period t and t- 1
in one sample can only be due to differences in the magnitude and composition
of the inflow and outflow of workers. Thtts, the differences in the edttcation job
complexity distribtttion across samples can be partly explained by the fact. that
we miss promotions within firms. We can however not rttle out that some of the
differences are dtte to sampling errors. Most of the empirical analysis of the next
section will therefore be carried out for sepazate job complexity levels. We see
from Table 3(date t, survey t) that in 1993, 18.5Q1o of all employed workers was
reported to be employed at a simplejob, in 1994 this was 21.301o while in 1995 this
was 19.301o and in 1996, it was only 14.4010. At the same time we see from table
4 that in 1993, 60.9P1o had a lower education, in 1994, this fraction was 61.8Q1o,
in 1995 it was 58.4oI' o and in 1996 it was 54.9010. The fractions of workers with
primary school only for 1993-96 are respectively: 7.4010, 6.Solo, 7.901o and 6.O~lo.
Thus the 1996 sample contains a smaller faction of simple jobs and relatively
fewer workers with a lower education than the other samples.
To get some ideas about the empirical relevanceofcrowding out in the mid 90's
we will first test whether a larger fraction of simple jobs was occupied by higher
educated workers in the low employment year 1993. The results of otu simple
test on the existence of crowding out are shown in Table 7 which indicates that
relatively fewer workers with an intermediate and higher education were employed
at a simple job (level fl~fl) in the low employment years 1993 and 1994 than
in 1995 and 1996.~ In 1993, 6.9010 of the workers at simple jobs had followed an
intermediate or higher edttcation and in 1994 this fraction was 7.301'o while in 1995
and 1996, respectively 8.201o and 9.9qo of the workers at simple jobs had completed
at least an intermediate education. Thus in the high employment years, the
average education level at simple jobs seems to be somewhat higher. Under
crowding out, we would expect the opposite. The data also give information
on the destination of exiting workers. Table 8 shows that workers with a lower
edttcation and workers employed at simple jobs have higher layoff rates than
workers with a higher education and workers employed at complex jobs. This is
~Tables 18 -21 give a more e~ctensive view on the distribution of workers aver jobs.
8consistent with the labor hoarding story we discussed at the beginning of this
paper. The layoff rates are much higher for all worker and job types in the low
employment year 1993. We also see that in the high employment yeazs 1995 and
1996, the highly edttcated workers move more often to a new job while in the
low employment yeazs, the workers with a lower education move more often to a
new job. It is likely that those decisions aze based on different motivations. The
lower echtcated workers who anticipate a layoff or dismissal dtuing a downturn
are likely to increase their search intensity while on the other hand, booms are
typically periods when the rewards to seazch are much higher for workers with a
higher edttcation. As job search theory predicts, most job to job movements aze
from workers employed at sitnple jobs. It is more likely to find a better position
when one is employed at the bottom of the job ladder than at the top.
The descriptive statistics in this section show that recessions are not periods
in which more highly edttcated workers occttpy simple jobs. We do find evidence
that lay off rates for workers with a lower education are higher than for workers
with a higher edttcation. In the next section we will test whether there is evidence
for crowding out at the firm level.
3 A test on cyclical crowding out
In this section we directly test the hiring and firing policy of firms with respect
to the edttcation reqttirements of their work force. As mentioned before, the
hypothesis we test is very mttch related to Olnm's (1984) idea that employers are
often reluctant to lower wages during bad times and instead increase education
standards for given jobs.
Unlike previotts studies, which have been based on aggregate data, otu data
allow us to directly test to what extent employers increase their education stan-
dards in periods of increasing tmemployment. In the next section we explicitly
define a variable which meastues the difference between average education re-
quirements for the inflow aztd for the outflow at a given job complexity level in
a given firm. We test whether this variable is larger during bad times. In the
remaining of this section, we say more on the educational reqturements over the
cycle for inflow and outflow sepazately and in addition we test for selectivity bias.
3.1 Do firms upgrade their work force in bad times?
In this section we perform a direct test of the hypothesis that fums increase the
educational level of their work force dtuing bad times. Since the sort of activities
within a pazticular job complexity level can change over the cycle we have to
define a job at the lowest possible aggregation level. Below we explain how we
meastue upgrading.
Let y~k be the average mtmber of years of education for the mfiow into
9job complexity level k at fum j and let y~kt be the average nttmber of years of
education for the outflow from job complexity level k at firm j. s We will assiune
that the amount of reqtrired schooling for both inflow and outflow at each job
complexity level depends on observable firm characteristics, job specific effects
and macro-economic conditions, which are capttued by calendar time diunmies.
ss x
in in ~n in in
~Jjk - ajk } Nk ~jt} ~ ~ ~Yktdkt } Ejk (1)
t-93k-1
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where cr~k and n~tare fixed job effects, Qkand Qkt are coefHcient estimates of
the firm effects, xjt is a vector with firm chazacteristics in year t, ryké and ?'kit aze
coefficient estimates of the calendar time effects, dkt is a dummy which is equal
to 1 for job complexity level k and yeaz t and zero otherwise and E~k and e~kt are
i.i.d. error terms.
If firms increase education standazds for certain jobs, we expect that in 1993,
in which tmemployment grew strongly, the difference between the years of educa-
tion for the inflow and the outflow at given job complexity leveLs, will be higher
than in the high employment years 1995 and 1996. Thiis the effect of dk93 on
( y~k - y,kt) gives us information on potential upgrading of firms. Before we can
estimate those effects, we will assume that the firm effects have the same value
in both the in9ow and the outflow equations but we will allow the job effects to
differ, hence cr~k - tx~t - a~. Thus we estimate
q 95 K
(yjk - ykt) - ~k } F~k~jtf ~~ ryktdkt f Ejk
t-93k-1
(3)
The results can be found in table 9. For most job complexity levels, the effect
of dk93 on (y~k - y,kt) is zero or even negative (relative to dkys). Only for job
complexity level2 it is significantly positive with a coefficient estimate of 0.31 (s.e.
is 0.15).9 We also see that during our sample periods, the mean of ( y~k-y,kt) was
positive for all job complexity levels and that most of the upgrading took place
at intermediate job complexity levels. It is still interesting to see how the inflow
and oiitflow eqtiations behave separately and whether ttunover is higher under
sWe excluded retirements from the outflow because the older cohort has in general followed
a relatively lower education and occupies relatively complex jobs. Including this cohort did
however not lead to any changes of our conclusions.
9We could not reject the joint hypothesis that the coef6cient estunates of the 1993 dummies
are zero in all equations (F[5,4319]-1.13). Moreover, we experimented with a recession dummy
which takes the value 1 in 1993 and 1994 and zero otherwise. For none of the job complexity
levels we found a signiScant effect of the recession dummy. We aLso could not reject the
hypothesis that the recession dummy was zero in all equations, F[5,4341]-0.87.
10low skilled workers. This will be the siibject of the next section. In addition we
will check to what extent our results are disttubed by selectivity bias.
3.2 Sensitivity analyses and the quality of new and sepa-
rating workers over the cycle
To get an idea on potential sample selection eftects, we will check whether the
fact that both in and outflow are observed has a significant effect on the calen-
dar time dummies for the inflow and outflow equations. Those equations aLso
give information on the cyclical behavior of the education requirements for new
workers and whether recessions aze periods in which mainly workers with a lower
education separate from a given job. Thus consider the following equations:
ss x
in in ~rin ,t,in wt [~ in Cin out in O
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Where ~t'~k and n,kt take the value 1 when respectively inflow and outflow are
observed and zero otherwise. An F-test on the joint significance of ~k and {ké
and of ~kt and fktt will tell i~s something about different behavior of the fums
for which we observe both in- and outflow simiiltaneot~sly. Tables 10 and 11 show
that for job complexity levels 1,3 and 4 we cannot reject the mill hypothesis that
~k and ~ké are zero. Including ~kn,kt and ~kCtdktrt`~k in the inflow equation leads
to a somewhat smaller effect of the 1993 dummy. For the outflow equation, we
have to reject the mill hypothesis that ~k and ~ktdke are zero for job complexity
levels 3 and 6-8. Those tables also learn i~s that in 1993, the average ediication
of both in- and outflow was close to zero or negative (relative to 1996). The
estimates for all job levels together even show a significantly negative effect for
both the education of the in- and outflow in the low employment years. In the
appendix we compaze the hiring and firing behavior of firms over a number ofsiib
samples to learn more about selectivity and in addition we re-estimate equations
1 and 2 with the two-stage Heckman (1979) method. Tables 16 and 17 show that
the coefficient estimates of the selectivity terms aze insignificant for all job levels
of the outflow equations (except for the one based on the entire sample) and
significantly positive for job complexity IeveLs 1 and 3. The coefficient estimates
of the 1993 dtimmy are however almost eqiial to the ones in Tables 10 and 11.
To sum up, we cannot rule out that some of oiu estimates of the previoi~s
section are biased becattse of sample selection. The separate estimates for in-
and oittflow do show that in the low employment year 1993, the average educa-
tion of the inflow did not increase (for all job levels together it even decreased
significantly) but that the average education level of the outflow level did in gen-
eral strongly decrease. This suggests that if any form of upgrading takes place
11in periods of high imemployment, this is the resiilt of outflow of workers with a
relatively low education.
4 Do higher educated workers earn more at sim-
ple jobs than lower educated workers?
Next, we test whether the wage earnings of workers who have followed relatively
many years of schooling at a given job complexity level are higher or lower than
the wages of other workers at the same job complexity level within the same
firm. In other words, we test whether, conditioning on job complexity leveLs, the
returns to schooling are still positive. If this is the case, it is likely that the workers
with more schooling are also more productive on those jobs. When workers with
relatively many years of schooling at their job level earn less than the other
workers this cotdd be caused by a number of things. Firstly, it can reflect a wage
penalty which the workers with surplus schooling have to pay becairse of their
larger qtut probability. This is consistent with equilibrium search models of the
Pissarides (1990) type. When a worker with a higher education woiild temporarily
accept a job below his level and would contimie searching for a better job he needs
to produce si~ciently more on this job than the workers with a lower ediication
to compensate the employers for the smaller match siupliLS (caused by his larger
quit probability). Alternatively it could reflect a lower prodtictivity of the workers
with surplus schooling. It is for example possible that highly educated workers
aze less productive on simple repeating activities than lower educated workers.
Finally, observed negative rettuns to schooling at given job levels can be the result
of imobserved characteristics of those workers, for which we cannot control, like
for example type of study and social skills. In the literature, workers who have
more education than required for a certain occiipation are sometimes labeled to
be overschooled . We prefer to avoid this term because, although it is possible
to measi~re required schooling, it is very hard to determine whether someone is
overschooled or not. This is due to the fact that the productivity of a job depends
on both worker, firm and match characteristics. Instead, we will define a new
variable, z;~k, for every worker and job pair, which equals: (w;~k- w~k) where
w;~k is the log of the hourly wage of worker i at firm j at job complexity level
k and w~kis the log of the average hourly wage at job complexity level k in firm
j. Thus we compare the wage of each worker with the average wage at the same
job complexity level in the same firm the worker is employed at. This enables
i~s to check whether higher educated workers are more productive on simple jobs
and whether the returns to schooling at a given job complexity level change over
the bt~siness cycle. Since we want to allow required schooling at a given job
complexity to vary across firms, we will define the variable s;~k -(ed;~k- ed~k),
where ed;~k is the amoimt of schooling (in years) of worker i at firm j at job
12level k and ed~k is the average amount of education at job level k in firm j. We
can now regress z~~k on various firm and worker c.haracteristics , on s;~k and on
calendar time.
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where x;~k contains both firm and worker characteristics. We have restricted our
analysis to the inflow of new workers at period t becat~se only then we are stue to
captttre the firm's wage policy during period t and we don't have to bother about
the endogeneity of temue.to Also note that we now use the individual as unit
of observation and that we have to weight accordingly.r' When the process of
upgrading the work force actually leads to a higher productivity, it is more appro-
priate to tallc about substitution than about crowding out. Under substitution,
we expect that at. a given job complexity level, workers with a higher edtrcation
earn higher wages. E~om Table 12 we see that new workers with relatively many
years of schooling earned almost the same as the other workers at simple jobs,
althottgh the coefficient for job complexity level 2 is significantly negative and
for job complexity level 3 it is significantly positive. This result might be puz-
zling to those who are familiar with the literattrre on "overschooling". Dtmcan
and Hoffman (1981), Rtunberger (1987), Hersch (1991), Hartog and Oosterbeek
(1985) and other studies strrveyed in Hartog (1998) all fotmd that the rewards
to strrpltrs schooling are positive. None of those studies corrected however for
fixed firm effect.s. To get a better idea of the differences between otrr results and
those fotmd in the literattrre on overschooling, we have repeated our estimates
without correcting for fixed firm effects ( the coefficient estimates with s.e.'s of
the schooling variable are presented in the last two rows of Table 12). Except for
job level 1, the coefficient estimates for the effects of schooling on gross hotuly
wages turn out to be highly significant in this case. This sttggests that workers
with relatively many years of schooling (given their jobs) tend to select them-
selves into high wage firms and that. the restdts of the "overschooling" literattrre
are mainly driven by selectivity effects.12 Otrr findings suggest that the workers
with relatively many years of schooling compared to their direct colleagues trse
their education as a compensation for a lack of other skills.
Flrrthermore, we see that at f3-f5, females earn significantly less than males
even if we control for job levels. Not inclttded in the table aze the effects of
shrinking and growing firms. Only for f5 we found a significant negative effect
of the "growing firm" dummy on z,~k, although the value was small (0.05, s.e.
~oThis is also the reason why for each job complexity level the mean of z;~k is negative.
11WLS was necessary because more than 300 strata were used in the sample and we therefore
could not include all cross products of firm and size classes on the right hand side of the
equations.Weighted and unweighted regressions gave however very similar results.
12See Hartog (1998) for a discussion ofother measurement problems related to overschooling.
130.02). Also not included are the effects of a collective wage agreement which was
only significantly positive for f3 (0.02, s.e: 0.01).
5 Conclusion
Cyclical crowding out is the process where lower edticated workers at simple jobs
are replaced by higher educated workers in periods whenjobs are relatively scarce.
Crowding out as explanation for the high and cyclical tmemployment rate oflower
educated workers has become increasingly populaz in the Netherlands. There aze
however many other possible reasons for those facts. Therefore, if we really want
to take crowding out serious, it has to be supported by the data. Our results
stiggest that in periods of low employment, less workers with an intermediate or
higher education are employed at simplejobs, which is inconsistent with crowding
out. In addition, we find that for all job types, the average education went tip in
the first halfofthe nineties. For intermediate jobs, the average difference between
years of schooling of the in- and outflow of workers is highest.
Only for one of the lower job complexity levels we find evidence that firms
tipgraded their work force in the low employment year 1993. For the other 5 job
complexity levels we find no evidence for upgrading dtrring recession years. We
aLso find no evidence that the average education of the inflow increased dt~ring
recession but we did find strong evidence that, in particular during low employ-
ment periods, workers with relatively few yeazs of completed education sepazate
more frequently than higher educated workers.
New workers with a relatively high edtication earn abotit the same as their
colleagues at the same job level at the same firm in the same year. For job com-
plexity level 3(which contains by far the most workers), we find that workers
with relatively many years of schooling earn slightly (but statistically significant)
more than their direct colleagues at the same job level in the same firm while
at job complexity level 2, workers with relatively many years of schooling earn
slightly less (btit statistically significant) than their direct colleagues. The gen-
eral evidence is thus that workers with relatively many years of schooling at given
job complexity levels are not more productive at those jobs than their direct col-
leagties. The difference between otir results and the results in the literattue on
"stuplus schooling" is driven by the fact that we take accotmt of firm specific
effects. It tttrns out that workers with relatively many years of schooling (com-
pazed to other workers at the same job level) select themselves into high wage
firms.
We also conclude that the evidence for crowding out is very thin. As far as it
takes place, it is more outflow driven than inflow driven. If crowding out wotild
have been an important reason for the high tmemployment rate oflower educated
workers, policy makers should stimulate job creation at the top segments of the
labor market to encotirage higher educated workers to leave simple jobs. Otu
14res~ilts siiggest however that it is more likely that lower ediicated workers become
unemployed becai~se their jobs aze not productive enough any more. Policies to
reduce imemployment of lower educated workers shoidd therefore focus directly
on the lower segment of the labor mazket. One can think of decreasing the cost
of creating lower educated jobs by means of tax incentives, stimulate the training
of lower ediicated workers, or allow firms to temporary lower their wages in bad
t.imes.
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17Appendices
A Sensitivity analyses
The estimates of Table 9 potentially suffer from selectivity bias since we observe
( y~k - y,kt) orily for a limited amount of firms. To get an idea of the importance
of this problem we will take two approaches. First, we will compare the hiring
and firing behavior of a number ofsub samples with each other to check to what
extent the firms for which we observe simultaneous in and outflow at a given job
complexity level behave differently from fu-ms at which we observe only inflow or
only outflow at given job complexity levels. Secondly, we reestimated equations 1
and 2 using the two-stage sample selection bias correction approach of Heckman
(1979).
The variables n~k and n,kt take the value 1 when respectively inflow and
oiitflow are observed and zero otherwise. Let the equations that determine the
sample selection be:
~ 95` [ K'~




n,kt - 6~ f tc~x~tf ~~~k L tdkt f r1,kt (8)
t-93k-1
Since the sampling rule is that ( y~k - yki) is observed when both n~k and n,kt
~ 0 we get an imbiased estimator for E( y~k - y~~x~c, n~k ~ 0, nkt ) 0) when
(E~k- E,kt) 1(n~k, n,kt) . In that case we can estimate the effect of
(1ik93 - ~i! 9 )
on the conditional mean of (y~k - y,kt) by WLS. To test this, we will compaze
the coef6cient estimates of ry~3 and ryk93, (for the low employment year 1993)
based on different subsets of our sample, with each other. Consider the following
equations (in terms of conditional expectations).
a E(y~k - y,kt~x~t,n~k ~ O,n,kt ~ 0)
b E(y;k~x;t,n~k 1 0)
C E(yjk~2~t, n~k 1 ~, n~kt ~ 0)
d E(y;kl~it, njk 1 9, n,kt 1 0)
e E(y,kt~xikt,n,kt 1 0)
f.E(y~~~x~e, n~k G 0, nkt ~ Q)
g E(y,kt~x~t, n~k ~ 0, n,kt 1 0)
18Comparing (b) ,(c) and (d) gives information to what. extent ~rk` is indepen-
dent of E~k and ~~k. We see from Tables 13-15 that. in specification (d), the effect
of t.he low employment year 1993 on the edttcation level of the inflow is somewhat
more negative then for specifications (b) and (c) at job levels 1 and 2 while for job
level 3 it. is slight.ly more positive. Comparing (e), (f) and (g) gives information
to what extent rl~k is independent of s~` and rl~k`. From the same tables we see
t.hat for job levels 1 and 3, the coefHcient of the 1993 dttmmy is positive or less
negative for specification (g) while for job level 2 it is more negative. Finally,
comparison of (b-e) with (a) ,(c-f) with (a) and (d-g) with (a) gives tts informar
tion on the dependence of (E~k,E,k`) and (rhk, ~,k`). For job levels 2 and 3 we are
likely to overestimate the upgrading effect in 1993 by restricting the analysis to
firms for which we observe bot.h in- and outftow at given job complexity levels
while for job level 1 we are likely to imderestimate the ttpgrading effect in 1993.
An alternative way to test and correct for some of the sample selection bias
is to estimate the in- and outflow equations with Heckman's (1979) two-step
estimation procedttre. The coefficient estimates of the inverse Mill ratio, ~3'ak and
~iak` gives us information on the selectivity bias.13 Tables 16 and 17 show that
those coefficient estimates for the selection terms aze significant for job levels 1,
3 and 5 of the inflow equations and insignificant for all job levels of the outflow
equation.
B AVO data
The AVO data were collected by the Dutch "Labor inspection" (AI) which is
part of t.he department of Social Affairs and contains administrative data from
workers employed in both the private and the pttblic sector. For otu attalysis we
only ttsed workers who were entployed in the private sector. Below we give a more
detailed description on the construction of some of the key vaziables.
Job complexity levels
Simple
fl Very simple activities which do not change over time. No schooling is neces-
sary and only limited experience. The activities are tmder direct supervi-
sion.
f2 Simple activit.ies which are in general repeating. Some (lower) administrative
or technical knowledge and experience is required. In general the activities
take place tmder direct supervision.
13In the probits with re~k and n~k` as dependent variables, we included the same exogenous
variables as in the regressions of Table 9 since there are no obvious vaziables which affect the
years of schooling of the inflow and the outflow but do not inftuence the fact that we observe
either in or outflow, the identification of the Heckman model depends fully on the parametric
assumptions.
19Intermediate
f3 Less simple activities which do not repeat themselves continuously. Admin-
istrative or technical knowledge is required and the activities are partly
without direct supervision.
f4 More difficiilt (non-repeating) activities for which an intermediate level of
education is required. In general the activities take place without direct
supervision.
High
íb Activities within a certain field which require a higher level of knowledge and
experience. The activities take place without direct supervision.
ffl Managing activities of an analytical, creative or contact nature, which are
imdertaken independently and require an university or comparable level.
f7 Managers of intermediate companies or comparable plants, departments etc.
who also participate in decision making.
f8 Managers of large companies or comparable plants or departments.
In this paper we merged f7 and f8 and when reported f6-8 becatuse of the
few observations in f~ and fl
Education
We have information on 7 types of schooling (total yeazs, including the reqiured
schooling to enter a particular type of education, between brackets):
Lower: primary, sl (6), junior general, s2 (10) and pre-vocational, s3 (10)
Intermediate: senior general, s4 (12) , senior vocational, s5 (14)
Higher vocational colleges, a6 (15) and university, s7 (16).
outflow
Workers not older than 60 years who left a firm because of (early) retirement,
disability, their test-period ended, layoff, displacement, they reported to have
found a new job or they were initially hired from a temporary employment office.
We do not observe movements between jobs within fums.
inflow
Workers who enter a new firm. Again, we do not observe within firm labour
flows.
tenure:
Measured in years (difference between starting and sampling date).
20wage
Monthly wages (including extaa time payments, profits shazes etc.) and hotus
worked are measured very accurately. We calculated nominal gross hourly wages
for each worker and deflated the wage by the constuner price index to obtain real
wages.
wage agreement
We distingtush 3 types of wage contracts. Most workers have a collective wage
agreement (CAO) which is bargained over at the sectoral level. The minister
of social affairs has the right to force all firms within a sector to pay the same
collectively bargained wage (AW) and fmally there are workers who have a
bilateral bazgained wage contract. Those workers are in general employed at
higher positions..
part- time ~full-time
Part-time refers to working less than 100Q1o of the regttlar munber of hotus
occupation
We have information on the following occupations :(1) simple technical activi-
ties, (2) administrative, (3) computer, (4) commercial, (5) service orientated, (6)
creative. (7) management.
sector
Althotigh the AVO data contain information on the public sector we restricted
oiir analysis to the private sector. We distingttish 12 sectors. (1) agrictilttue and
fishing, (2) food, (3) chetnical, (4) metal, (5) other industry, (6) construction,
(7) trade, (8) hotels, restatuants catering, (9) transport, commttnication, (10)
banking and instuance, (11) other services, (12) health care
firm size
We have tised the following size classes. (1) 1-9 ,(2) 10-19, (3) 20-49 (4), 50-99,
(5)100.199, (6) 200.499, (7) ~ 500 employees.
21C Tables
Table 1: Unemployment rates for different educat
- q Unemployed Share of labor force
primary 15 8
junior general 9 22
senior general, pre-vocational 6 44
vocational colleges 5 17
university 6 8
total 7 10(l
ote: Source: Statistics Netherlands, EBB (1996
22Table 2: AVO data: weighted means 1993-
variable 93 94 95 96
workers employed at. shrinking firm (010) 30.6 30.4 24.6 26.5
workers employed at growing firm (olo) 33.2 39.0 44.8 41.6
male (Plo) 62.9 64.4 62.3 64.0
female (qo) 37.1 35.6 37.7 36.0
inflow (~o of total employment) 11.8 10.8 13.4 13.8
outflow (qo of total employment) 11.0 8.7 9.6 10.0
collective wage agreement (CAO, AW) ( eIo) 74.1 78.7 77.0 76.4
age (years) 35.8 35.9 36.0 36.0
completed education (years) 11.2 11.2 11.3 11.5
real gross hoiuly wage (Dutch guilders) 25.9 24.1 26.7 27.2
temue (years) 7.5 8.0 7.5 7.8
firm size (1-19 employees) 87.8 79.7 80.8 81.0
firm size (20-49 employees) 7.1 12.5 11.4 11.1
firm size (50-99 employees) 2.2 4.3 4.4 3.3
firm size (100-199 employees) 1.1 1.9 1.7 1.6
firm size (200-499 employees) 0.8 1.1 1.0 1.1
firms ( 1500 employees) 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7
~ workers 24053 31250 26059 36380
~ firms 1682 1563 1375 1548
ote: Individual recotds are weighted by individual'Srm weights, firm records are aveighted
by firm weights
Table 3: Allocation of workers over job complexity levels (in qo
No
date sample fl f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7 total





























































Oct 96 96 3.5 10.9 47.1 23.9 11.7 2.8 0.1 100
Differences between samples are partly due to the fact that we do not observe promotiona
within Srms.
23Table 4: Allocation of workers over education cl
No
date sample sl s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 total
Oct 92 93 7.7 13.2 40.2 8.4 18.4 9.4 2.6 100
Oct 93 93 7.4 13.3 39.9 8.7 18.6 9.5 2.7 100
Oct 93 94 7.1 12.5 42.8 7.1 19.3 8.9 2.3 100
Oct 94 94 6.8 12.8 42.2 7.4 19.3 9.1 2.5 100
Oct 94 95 8.0 13.5 37.3 7.8 20.0 10.3 3.2 100
Oct 95 95 7.9 13.6 36.9 8.0 19.9 10.5 3.3 100




















Differences between samples are partly due to the fact that we do not observe formal training
between 2 sample periods.
Indicator 93 V 94 95 96
imemployment change oI' o 22.7 15.4 -6.7 -6.6
employment change (07'0, EBB)
persons -0.1 0.4 2.1 2.1
man Y~ -0.5 -0.3 2.1 1.7
new vacancies x1000 383 438 526 571
filled vacancies x1000 396 428 508 561
employment x1000 5754 5778 5897 6016
: Source tatist~cs Nether an s. EBB ~s the Dutch Labor force study.
V~U 93 95 96 93~95 93~96
primary 0.002 0.030 0.040 0.067 0.050
junior general 0.169 0.038 0.038 4.445 4.445
pre- vocational 0.068 0.133 0.133 0.511 0.511
senior general 0.025 0.075 0.052 0.328 0.481
senior vocational 0.076 0.172 0.156 0.574 0.487
vocational colleges 0.099 0.194 0.217 0.510 0.456
imiversity 0.035 0.075 0.126 0.467 0.278
Table 6: V~U ratio's for a high and a low employme
ote: Source Jtat~stics Netherlan
24Table 7: Allocation of workers over jobs 1993-96 (in o10
job level fl,f2 f3,f4 t3-fg
education 93 94 95 96 93 94 95 96 93 94 95 96
lower 93.1 92.7 91.8 90.1 63.0 61.5 58.7 58.4 6.5 4.8 3.4 3.5
intermediate 6.5 6.9 7.2 8.9 32.8 33.1 34.9 34.8 28.4 25.7 21.3 22.9
higher 0.4 0.4 1.0 1.0 4.2 5.5 6.4 6.8 65.1 69.5 75.3 73.7
Table 8: Oiitflow by education and job complexity level (in olo
education job complexity level
sl-s3 s4,s5 s6,s7 fl,f2 f3,f4 f5-f8
l~yoff
93 8.3 7.2 7.7 10.4 7.4 6.2
94 2.6 1.4 1.2 2.8 2.0 1.3
95 2.1 1.5 2.1 2.8 1.7 1.4
96 2.4 1.4 1.0 2.5 1.8 0.7
to otherjob
93 1.5 0.9 0.8 2.4 1.0 0.5
94 4.4 3.9 4.2 5.4 3.9 3.7
95 5.8 5.1 6.0 7.1 5.2 6.8
96 5.8 6.0 6.3 6.5 5.9 5.4
total outflow
93 12.7 10.2 10.5 16.2 10.8 8.4
94 10.4 7.6 7.7 13.1 8.3 7.6
95 11.3 9.0 10.0 14.7 9.4 9.3
96 11.4 9.7 9.4 14.2 10.0 8.2
Table 9: Coefficient estimates of WLS with (y';k - yki) as dependent variable
job complexity level fl f2 f3 f4 f5 f6-8 all
N 218 928 1931 810 349 113 4349
y'k - y,kt mean 0.18 0.25 0.32 0.52 0.31 0.24 0.32
R~ 17.7 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.15 0.46 0.01
ak -0.20 -0.36 0.64 1.08 -0.12 1.18 0.37
s.e 0.81 0.27 0.18 1.11 2.61 0.35 0.14
Note: Including sector, rm size and year dummies. nly or f2 a sign' cant positive e ect
was found for the low employment year dummy 1993 (0.31, s.e. 0.15, relative to 1996).
Unweighted estimates gave qualitatively similar results. Coefficient estimates which are
significant on the 95 0!0 level are printed in bold. We wuld not reject the hypothesis that the
1993 dummy was zero in all equations, (F[6, 4319] - 1.17)
25Table 11i: Coe~tlicient estimates of WLS with outflow dummies and y' ~k as depen-
dent vari~~hie
job complexity level fl f2 f3 f4 f5 f6-g all
N 478 1765 2937 1448 757 297 7682
y`k mean
~
9.05 9.83 10.97 13.41 14.84 15.6 11.4
R 0.13 0.03 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.22 0.12
~~k 9.79 9.61 11.04 14.30 15.04 15.28 10.72
s.e (0.49) (0.19) (0.15) (0.37) (0.45) (0.20) (0.14)
1993 -0.62 0.01 0.02 -0.24 -0.14 0.09 -0.26
s.e. (0.28) (0.12) (0.09) (0.12) (0.10) (0.13) (0.07)
1994 -0.32 0.33 -0.08 0.20 0.00 -0.07 -0.27
s.e (0.28) (0.13) (0.09) (0.13) (0.10) (0.16) (0.08)
1995 -0.35 0.04 -0.11 0.05 -0.00 0.34 -0.21
s.e. (0.26) (0.13) (0.09) (0.12) (0.09) (0.15) (0.08)
out -3.20 -1.16 -0.78 0.96 -0.22 -0.00 -0.44
s.e (0.25) (0.46) (0.21) (0.25) (0.28) (1.50) (0.18)
out93 1.43 1.23 0.18 -1.12 0.69 -0.05 -0.26
s.e (1.07) (0.57) (0.27) (0.46) (0.54) (1.60) (0.25)
oiit94 3.88 1.14 0.82 -1.76 0.61 -0.06 0.02
s.e 1.13 (0.57) (0.34) (0.51) (0.74) (1.65) (0.28)
out95 3.16 1.59 0.26 -1.24 -0.03 0.35 0.16
s.e 1.12 (0.58) (0.34) (0.43) (0.48) (1.53) (0.28)
F a,n-zi 5.25 1.80 7.09 4.01 0.62 0.19 6.25
Note: WLS estiIDates. Ccefficients which are sienificant. nn thP ol la.,Pl n ;.,r~ ;.. ~.,.ia
Including sector and firm size dummies. The F-test is on the joint significance of Q~k and i;ke
26'Pihlc I L Co~.Hicient estimates of WLS with inflow dumrnies and y~ki as depen-
~ c ~t ~~~~rirtlilr
job complexity level fl f2 f3 f4 f5 f6-8 all
N 357 1432 2705 1405 721 299 6943
y,ki mean 8.44 9.46 10.47 12.96 14.38 15.22 11.36
R2 0.17 0.04 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.36 0.12
a~k~ 9.64 9.86 9.91 12.56 14.11 16.84 10.25
s.e (0.72) (0.25) (0.14) (0.42) (0.97) (1.11) (0.15)
1993 -1.25 -0.14 -0.03 -0.54 -0.28 -0.34 -0.41
s.e. (0.37) (0.15) (0.08) (0.13) (0.15) (0.17) (0.08)
1994 -0.10 0.00 -0.04 -0.17 -0.16 -0.18 -0.48
s.e (0.36) (0.17) (0.09) (0.14) (0.18) (0.20) (0.09)
1995 -0.08 -0.17 0.32 0.03 0.15 0.20 -0.12
s.e. (0.37) (0.17) (0.08) (0.14) (0.17) (0.18) (0.08)
in 0.86 0.46 0.24 0.43 0.14 -0.40 -0.03
s.e. (0.46) (0.28) (0.17) (0.27) (0.32) (0.38) (0.16)
in93 -0.33 -0.14 0.39 -0.11 0.08 -0.87 0.04
s.e. (0.82) (0.35) (0.23) (0.41) (0.51) (0.51) (0.22)
in94 -1.67 -0.14 0.08 -0.72 -0.03 0.65 0.18
s.e. (0.70) (0.40) (0.27) (0.45) (0.53) (0.50) (0.25)
in95 -0.24 -0.06 -0.62 -0.07 -0.91 -0.39 0.17
s.e. (0.87) (0.45) (0.28) (0.40) (0.60) (0.89) (0.26)
F 9,,,-k 1.62 1.82 6.10 1.42 0.59 4.34 0.41
Note: WLS estimates. Coefficients which are signiScant on the olo level are printed in bold.
Including sector and Srm size dummies. The F-test is on thejoint signiScance of ~k and ~k~
27Table 12: CoefHcient estimates of WLS regression with z;~k as dependent vaziable
(for the inflow only) variable
job complexity level fY f2 f3 f4 t~ fi~g ~1
N 1061 3663 7283 2734 1243 375 1635
z; k me8i1
~
-0.08 -0.11 -0.13 -0.14 -0.16 -0.27 -0.13
R 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.20 0.26 0.24 0.19
ak -8.26 -11.29 -12.20 -6.71 -9.81 4.70 -6.9!
s.e (0.61) (0.43) (0.32) (0.82) (1.62) (4.28) (0.21
s:jk -0.00 -0.006 0.005 0.00 0.00 -0.09 0.00
s.e. (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.01) (0.06) (O.OC
1993 -0.01 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 -0.07 0.03
s.e. (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.013) (0.02) (0.05) (0.01
1994 -0.07 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.11 0.02
s.e (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.06) (0.01
1995 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 0.00 -0.14 -0.0'
s.e. (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.012) (0.02) (0.05) (0.01
log age 4.72 6.51 6.80 3.54 5.00 -2.99 3.76
s.e. (0.36) (0.24) (0.19) (0.47) (0.91) (2.42) (0.13
(log age) -0.66 -0.92 -0.94 -0.46 -0.63 0.48 -0.5]
s.e. (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) 0.07 0.13 (0.34) (0.02
female -0.01 -0.01 -0.013 -0.05 -0.06 -0.08 -0.00
s.e. (0.01) (0.01) (0.006) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.00
yrs schooling (no firm effects) 0.004 0.007 0.014 0.011 0.012 0.09 0.05
s.e. (0.004) (0.002) 0.002 0.003 0.009 0.032 0.001
Note: z;;k is the difference between the real Rross hourly waee of individual i at inh
complexity level level k at firm j and the average real gross wage at job level k at firm j, s;~k
ia equal to the difference between the amount of schooling (in years) of individual i at job
complexity level k at firm j and the average amount of schooling (in years) at job level k at
firm j. Including industry, size, firm shrink and grow, CAO, AW and part time dummies.
Age is measured in years. The last two rows refer to estimates without fixed Srm effects (log
hourly wage was the dependent variable). CAO refers to a collective wage agreement and
AW refers to a sector binded (by the minister) wage agreement. For the pooled regression,
the coefficient estimate of CAO was 0.02 (0.005) and for AW it was 0.03 (0.008),for
shrinking firms it was 0.01 2(0.006) and for growing firms it was 0.02 (0.005). R,eference
states are ' year 1996', 'firms which did not change size, 'bilateral wage agreement', 'male'.
Coefficient estimates which are significant on the 95 010 level are ptinted in bold. The F
statistic for the hypothesis that s;jl - s;j2 -... - sij6 - 0, is equal to F[5, 16289] - 3.25
28Table 13: Estimates on different sub samples for job complexitv level 1
Note: The
specification
b c d e f g
ak 9.64 9.78 7.61 9.96 9.71 8.97
s.e (0.50) (0.51) (1.48) (0.71) (0.81) (1.38)
1993 -0.65 -0.63 -0.85 -1.42 -1.30 -0.47
s.e. (0.28) (0.28) (0.72) (0.32) (0.37) (0.67)
1994 -0.15 -0.32 -0.60 -0.50 -0.11 -0.44
s.e (0.27) (0.28) (0.63) (0.32) (0.36) (0.59)
1995 -0.21 -0.35 -1.48 -0.26 -0.05 0.40
s.e. (0.26) (0.26) (0.65) (0.33) (0.37) (0.60)
Table 14: Estimates on different sub samples for job complexitv level 2
specification
b c d e f g
ak 9.5? 9.62 10.82 9.93 9.86 11.38
s.e (0.19) (0.20) (0.45) (0.24) (0.27) (0.45)
1993 0.06 0.01 -0.07 -0.15 -0.14 -0.83
s.e. (0.12) (0.08) (0.28) (0.14) (0.16) (0.29)
1994 0.38 0.33 -0.14 -0.02 -0.01 -0.24
s.e (0.12) (0.13) (0.30) (0.15) (0.17) (0.30)
1995 0.12 0.04 -0.26 -0.20 -0.18 -0.47
s.e. (0.13) (0.13) (0.30) (0.16) (0.18) (0.31)
ote: The speci6cations refer to the ones in section Al.
Table 15: Estimates on different sub samples for iob complexitv level 3
specification
b c d e f g
ak 10.94 11.26 11.44 9.95 9.94 9.78
s.e (0.15) (0.15) (0.30) (0.14) (0.14) (0.28)
1993 0.01 0.02 0.29 0.01 -0.02 0.14
s.e. (0.08) (0.09) (0.16) (0.07) (0.08) (0.14)
1994 -0.02 -0.07 0.29 -0.04 -0.04 0.19
s.e (0.09) (0.09) (0.16) (0.08) (0.08) (0.15)
1995 -0.08 -0.11 0.24 0.26 0.33 0.58
s.e. (0.09) (0.09) (0.16) (0.08) (0.08) (0.14)
Note: The specifications refer to the ones in AI
29Table 16: Coefficient estimates of WLS with Heckman correction and y~k as
dependent variable
job complexity level fY f2 f3 f4 f5 f6-8 all
o~k 9.24 9.40 10.81 14.37 15.22 15.35 10.56
s.e (0.56) (0.21) (0.15) (0.39) (0.46) (0.22) (0.14)
1993 -0.65 0.07 0.02 -0.34 -0.08 0.17 -0.28
s.e. (0.28) (0.12) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.14) (0.07)
1994 -0.13 0.38 -0.02 0.08 0.04 -0.02 -0.27
s.e (0.27) (0.12) (0.09) (0.13) (0.10) (0.16) (0.08)
1995 -0.22 0.13 -0.07 -0.05 0.02 0.42 -0.20
s.e. (0.26) (0.13) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.14) (0.07)
ak 0.30 0.12 0.25 0.03 -0.18 -1.03 0.02
s.e (0.15) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.53) (0.03)
Note: 2-step Hecman se ection estimates. cient estimates w'ch are significant on the 95
Qlo level are printed in bold. Including sectot and firm size dummies. IdentiScation depends on
parametric assumptions only.
Table 17: Coefficient estimates of WLS with Heckman correction and y~k` as
dependent variable
job complexity level fY f2 f3 f4 f5 t6-8 all
~~k` 10.46 10.14 10.06 12.62 14.23 16.88 10.25
s.e (0.76) (0.26) (0.14) (0.43) (0.98) (1.15) (0.16)
1993 -1.34 -0.15 0.01 -0.55 -0.25 -0.40 -0.41
s.e. (0.33) (0.14) (0.07) (0.12) (0.14) (0.17) (0.07)
1994 -0.46 -0.00 -0.03 -0.24 -0.16 -0.07 -0.46
s.e (0.32) (0.15) (0.08) (0.14) (0.17) (0.18) (0.08)
1995 -0.21 -0.19 0.26 0.04 0.08 0.18 -0.14
s.e. (0.34) (0.16) (0.08) (0.13) (0.16) (0.18) (0.08)
ak -0.25 -0.07 -0.04 0.03 0.10 0.06 -0.1 1
s.e (0.14) (0.07) (0.04) (0.60) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04)
Note: ~step Hecman select~on estimates. Coefficient estimates which are signiScant on the 95
oJo level are printed in bold. Including sector and firm size dummies. Identification depends on
parametric assumptions otily.
30job complexity level yr fl f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7,8 q of total T
education 93
primary 51.7 23.9 4.1 1.0 0.4 0.3 0.0 7.4
jiinior general 15.4 28.7 15.1 4.7 2.7 2.2 0.8 13.3
pre-vocational 29.1 39.9 60.7 19.7 3.7 4.0 3.0 39.9
senior general 2.2 4.7 8.0 15.8 7.2 4.4 1.6 8.7
senior vocational 1.1 2.5 11.4 46.7 25.5 15.7 2.7 18.6
vocational colleges 0.5 0.3 0.6 11.3 53.3 34.1 37.2 9.5
university 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.8 7.3 39.4 54.7 2.7
ro of total 2.8 15.7 46.3 20.8 10.0 3.8 0.5 100
job complexity level yr fl f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7,8 P Io of total
education 94
primary 43.6 16.9 3.7 0.8 0.2 0.0 1.5 6.8
jimior general 28.5 27.7 12.6 3.9 1.5 0.5 0.6 12.8
pre-vocational 24.0 47.0 61.9 18.9 4.4 0.6 0.0 42.2
senior general 2.3 4.6 7.8 11.5 4.8 2.1 2.4 7.-1
senior vocational 1.6 3.2 12.8 49.9 25.7 9.2 2.9 14).3
vocational colleges 0.0 0.4 1.2 14.1 54.2 35.6 36.6 9.1
university 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.8 9.3 52.1 55.6 2..5
PIo of total 5.0 16.3 46.9 20.7 8.4 2.5 0.2 100
job complexity level yr fl f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7,8 q of total
education 95
primary 48.1 22.8 4.4 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 7.9
jimior general 22.0 28.5 15.8 3.9 1.3 0.5 0.0 13.6
pre-vocational 24.2 39.6 56.4 14.5 2.8 0.8 0.0 36.9
senior general 2.8 5.1 8.2 12.7 5.6 1.4 1.0 8.0
senior vocational 1.9 3.1 13.6 51.4 21.6 3.0 1.5 19.9
vocational colleges 1.0 0.6 1.4 15.9 60.9 25.4 16.4 10.5
iiniversity 0.0 0.4 0.2 1.2 7.7 68.9 81.1 3.3
Plo of total 5.2 14.1 47.3 21.2 9.0 2.9 0.2 100
31Table 21: Allocation of workers over 'obs
job complexity level yr fl f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7,8 q of total
education 96
primary 47.3 22.7 3.7 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 6.1
jtuiior general 21.7 27.2 20.4 4.2 1.4 0.2 0.0 14.5
pre-vocational 23.9 39.4 54.5 13.8 2.4 1.2 0.0 34.4
senior general 4.5 6.5 7.5 16.3 4.7 2.0 1.2 8.9
senior vocational 1.4 3.4 12.3 48.0 21.5 8.1 1.6 20.4
vocational colleges 1.0 0.6 1.4 15.2 58.7 38.0 42.3 12.4
tmiversity 0.2 0.3 0.2 1.9 11.2 50.5 55.0 3.4
010 of total 3.5 10.9 47.1 23.9 11.7 2.8 0.1 100.0
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